So, per usual practice, Pakistanis have found themselves embroiled in yet another diplomatic crisis of sorts, whereby their trust on civilian and military state institutions of Pakistan is being tested.

By now, I’m sure that almost every single one of you reading these words has all the background information on this case. So I shall not waste your time in giving a detailed backgrounder to this incident.

That said, without getting into the veracity of claims being lobbed against the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, I would really like to discuss the memo itself. And see if the anger being directed at it is solely because the institution of armed forces was undermined or is there more to it?

The memo contains 6 key points, and I’ll discuss a couple of them which I find very interesting.

1. President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harbored and offered assistance to UBL (OBL?) and other senior Al-Qaeda operatives. The White House can suggest names of independent investigators to populate the panel, along the lines of the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, for example.
2. The inquiry will be accountable and independent and result in findings of tangible value to the US government and the American people that identify with exacting details those elements responsible for harboring an aiding OBL inside and close to the inner ring of influence in Pakistan’s Government (civilian, intelligence directorate and military). It is certain that the OBL commission will result in immediate termination of active service officers in the appropriate government offices and agencies found responsible for complicity in assisting OBL.

The offer, at its face value, seems like that of a colony of the US offering its services to the United States government.

But moving on from there, what do you see? OBL was an accepted enemy of the state of Pakistan. We have officially gone to war against Al-Qaeda and have since the year 2001 sacrificed well over 30,000 lives (civilian and military) in this war. So, why should the government of Pakistan not conduct an independent inquiry into whether known terrorists of the likes of Osama Bin Laden and his cohorts were helped by any Pakistani?

As for the judicial commission probing the killing of OBL and circumstances that led to it, pray pay attention to who’s heading it, his appointment during 2007 emergency and the role he played at the very offset of judicial crisis and you’ll know where this commission is headed.

In other words, yaar kisko ullo ka patha samjha hoa hai?

4. One of the great fears of the military-intelligence establishment is that with your stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are now legitimate targets. The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of hte Pakistani government, – initially civilian but eventually all three power centers – to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program. This effort was begun under the previous military regime with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan’s nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.

So, if developing a framework geared towards bringing more transparency to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is wrong – and the steps under taken by the previous ‘military regime’ had to be ‘halted’ – when are we bringing culprits responsible from within the previous military regime to justice? Are the same authorities and people baying for blood for including nukes in this memo, ready to bring General (r) Pervez Musharraf to justice for actually undertaking such steps, with obvious monetary input from the United States Government, in the first place?

As noted by Mosharraf Zaidi here the time is ripe for Pakistan to kickstart a debate on Civilian-Military relationship and how Pakistanis wish to go about it.

To decide, if we are ready to address the differences or are we good with only prosecuting civilians while the men-in-camo get away with murder? The idea is pretty simple actually. Any such acts which put in question the very sovereignty of Pakistan, whether conducted by a military man or a civilian should be dealt with equal severity.

The ex-commander in chief of armed forces, who gave permission to foreign forces to station killer drones on Pakistani soil, who actually took money from the United States government to improve ‘security systems’ surrounding our nuclear weapons program and for making it more transparent, who allowed private military contractors to operate inside Pakistan – certainly did not question the sovereignty of Pakistan. We don’t get angry with him, instead offer explanations as to what else could Pakistan have done? The Americans had threatened us with sending us back to the stone ages, had we not sided with them. We sympathize with the poor generalissimo, for how hard would it have been for the poor soul to take such a decision.

He was therefore given a 21-gun salute and sent off prancing around the world to deliver lectures.

But at the same time, we ask for the head of the first civilian we see courting the Americans. Because he is of course putting in question the very sovereignty of Pakistan.

Hypocrisy, much?

The idea behind this post is not to underplay whatever Ambassador Haqqani did or did not do – but instead to reflect back on our inherent hypocrisy when treating matters of national security when the culprit is a civilian versus a military man. If Pakistanis did not act upon resolving this matter, that too on their own, I don’t believe there will be much time left before we even stop considering it an oddity.

Almost every major newspaper in Pakistan has gone nuts starting yesterday morning when Guardian established it on authority that Raymond is in fact working on contract with the CIA and was originally employed by XE (previously Blackwater). As of today Washington Post has further divulged that he was a part of a JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) covert unit, authorized to locate Al Qaeda and Lashker e Taiba members in Pakistan.

This bit of information gives further credence to the three reports by Jeremy Scahill for The Nation last year, which were at that time dis-credited by majority of the regional security analysis crowd as extreme far-left hogwash.

The Secret US War in Pakistan
The Expanding US War in Pakistan
Blackwater in Pakistan

Now, I have in mind a few questions, which I believe if answered, can correctly reflect upon the current status of cooperation between intelligence agencies of the United States and that of Pakistan.

It is generally considered true that ISI already knew about Raymond Davis’s employer being the CIA. Now, merging that information with the fact that a similar CIA unit helped ISI grab Mullah Bradar in Karachi last year, it can be reasonable well established that ISI was in absolute knowledge of the activities of this particular cell.

1. So how were the two other men, responsible for a hit and run, while trying to reach Davis able to escape Pakistan? I know it as well as any serious reader in here, that when it comes to intel ops, ECL is not the only list that can stop people from traveling out of Pakistan.
2. If the said unit was in fact snooping around for LeT members, and the ISI was already in cohorts, what does that say about our aspirations regarding local militant groups? Has ISI finally started the crackdown, even if in such a meagre way?
3. And the most serious question of them all, if for some reason the ISI did not know about what this unit was up to, what does that say about our counter-intelligence capabilities?

There’s a fourth question as well, and this is meant for the media coverage of this issue.

4. Associated Press, Washington Post and The New York Times all withheld information regarding Raymond Davis’s true employer in order to protect him from further scrutiny in Pakistan and for the sake of ‘National Security’ – how many Pakistani media channels or news papers would have done the same, if put in a similar situation?

In my personal opinion, it is about time that the military establishment and government of Pakistan came out clean when it comes to ties between US intelligence agencies and their Pakistani counter-parts. By doing that, they will not only be able to counter propaganda and spread of mis-information. But also let the world know, that Pakistan is in fact playing a serious role in this war.

While yes, there might be consequences for such a decision, but with the speed with which such incidents are coming to light these days, courtesy news media and the internet – they would be far better off by not being on the back-foot at every single such instance. It is time to get serious about this side of information warfare as well.

I was already planning to write a paragraph or two about Robert Haddick’s piece in Foreign Policy on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and then I came across this piece by @filterc at NI’s website, so thought of addressing both of them together.

The ‘hyperbole’ that India has never threatened Pakistan or that it maintains a no-first use policy on nuclear weapons are moot points, even if we don’t consider the violent history between the two nations. No nation maintains its weapons capability keeping in mind the ‘intentions’ of its natural adversary alone, which can always change but instead its capabilities. Furthermore, India’s policy of no-first use only deals with states which do not possess nuclear weapons, which automatically makes the point irrelevant in case of Pakistan.

Let me put it across bluntly, what Pakistan threatens India with is exactly what India threatens China with, and what China threatens the US with i.e unacceptable pain without any particular gains on the ground.

Now, in case of Pakistan such strategic status quo is increasingly dependent upon its non-conventional weapons program as opposed to its conventional fighting capability, since India is taking strong strides on the economic front which are resulting in it upgrading its armed forces’ both conventional and non-conventional weapons capabilities (MMRCA, FGFA, AMCA, new subsonic and supersonic cruise and ballistic missile programs, nuclear subs et al).

And hereby @filter_c argues that

No, the explanation is neither the most obvious, nor enduring.  Because it presupposes and rationalizes the argument that Pakistan must gain strategic parity with India under all circumstances. 

Keeping in view of the above mentioned reality, it can be argued that Pakistan cannot afford to, nor will ever seek to achieve parity with India. So then, how does it maintain the status quo? Essentially by upgrading its non-conventional weapons capabilities.

When I refer to the word ‘upgrading’, it doesn’t necessarily mean an increase in the ‘number’ of nuclear weapons but instead better and more accurate delivery platforms, more plutonium (instead of uranium) based warheads for its ballistic and cruise missiles (because they ensure a better ratio of yield versus weight of the fissile material used per warhead) and an ensured second nuclear strike capability by deploying plutonium based warheads on its subs. The idea is not to achieve parity – but to maintain the status quo.

This is where Pakistan’s strong objections to FMCT come into play. The idea behind the delay and the sudden increase of plutonium reactors is to enable Pakistan to accumulate sufficient plutonium stocks before Pakistan can no longer postpone entry into the FMCT.

It would also be prudent to note that Pakistan’s current plutonium reserves versus those of India, which has maintained a strong plutonium based nuclear weapons program since the 1970s, are akin to peanuts.

While India may not have converted its fissile stocks into warheads, it means nothing, since this can be done at a short notice. India has already ‘officially’ announced building a ‘triad’ (sea, air, land) of 400 operationally deployed nuclear weapons, which includes a second-strike capability, in its nuclear doctrine. These many number of weapons, including a sea-based second nuclear strike capability does have effects on ‘acceptable deterrence’ capability of an adversary nation, which is a dynamic and essentially a psychological concept.

It was in early 2009, when amidst all the doom and gloom; I mentioned that we will re-take agencies one by one. And, since then, you folks have seen that we went on to re-take Bajaur, then Mohmand, Swat, Darra Adam Khel – etc. This operation, I believe, should therefore be seen as an extension of the Pakistan Army’s operations in agencies, and not in isolation.

Forces present in the TO (Theater of Operation; South Waziristan)

• 3 divisions of the Pakistan Army. – 21,600 troops. Reserve: 1 brigade / division, bringing the total to about 28,800 troops
• 3 Corps of the FC [South Waziristan Scouts, Shawal Rifles & Tochi Scouts]. Each corps has about 2000 men. Bringing the total number of fighting troops to 6000.
• Support units like Armor, Engineers, Supply and FACs (forward air controllers or ground liaison officers) are in addition to above mentioned troops.

Do mind that Waziristan is already playing host to 11 and 12 corps of the Pakistan Army. [Above mentioned troops, are in addition to these troops]

All in all, you’re looking at a number of about 60 to 80,000 active duty soldiers in this theater of operations.

Realistic goals of the operation?

I don’t believe, that any one is under the impression that the Pakistan Army is going to have it easy. IMO, it’ll be a slow going operation and that the Pakistan Army is already bracing for heavy casualties.

_{Picture courtesy BBC}

In addition to that, IMO this operation will not be an “extermination exercise” as certain analysts have pointed out, but one involving a “re-take and hold” approach, within Mehsud dominated areas of South Waziristan. I expect denial of territory to the entire spectrum of militancy, to an extent that federal government can utilize political agent(s) for exerting full administrative control over the territory.

We are not going to be able to kill every Talib, or even take out their top leadership at the offset. But like in Swat, we can do plenty to ensure that the Khasadar and the FC forces are able to comfortably enforce the writ of the state.

Denial of territory to militants and re-establishment of governance structures in essentially lost areas is, in my opinion, the bare minimum we have to achieve.

Remember that these militants have destroyed the tribal customs and the very hierarchy of tribal leadership. Just in Waziristan, that amounts to 600+ elders murdered by these thugs (according to a 4 year old report).

So there is a genuine, traditional tribal leadership (well their offspring now!) which we can help rehabilitate. Provide enough security to them that they offer to federal government the historical role they used to play.

How would TTP react?

By now, many columnists from within Pakistan and outside have posed several questions pertaining to gauging TTP’s reaction to the operation – Questions such as; how do you think, TTP will respond to this operation? Apart from sending their cadres in settled areas of Pakistan, in order to create havoc, what else can we expect from them?

Well, the option of simply melting away, in my opinion, is simply not realistic, not anymore. Granted that some will definitely disperse, ultimately, the militants will balk at the idea of giving up their strongest of the strongholds just like that. You have to remember that South Waziristan is central to operations of not only TTP but also their “guests” so the idea that they will simply walk away quietly to somewhere safer is a non starter. They have invested 8 years worth of their time and effort to build up an environment and a support infrastructure that is conducive towards their militant activities.

They will give us a nasty fight and we should have no doubts about this.

Historically, it might be correct that militants used tactics of running away to an adjacent area when an operation was imminent, but do mind that we are talking about a time when entire Malakand, Mohmand, Bajaur, North and South Waziristan were firmly under their control and the state had largely walked away from its responsibility.

Now that luxury, at least to that extent, is simply not available for them.

If you folks can remember, it was in early 2009 amongst all the doom and gloom that I’d mentioned that we will re-take these agencies one by one. And you’ve seen that since then we went on to re-take Bajaur, Mohmand, Swat and Darra Adam Khel, etc.

The point being that these people have literally run out of places to go to. Even if we are to assume that some of them manage to escape to Orakzai or parts of Kurrum – Ultimately, we’ll be more than glad to follow them there too because as and when their area of freedom shrinks, it makes easier to take them on where-ever they happen to be.

My take on the Operation

My take though is that there is too much at stake in Waziristan. Principally, TTP cadres may be able to trickle into settle areas to avoid a traumatic fate or to live for another day … but that luxury is not available to their “guests”. The Uzbeks, Chechens and Arabs etc will have to fight it out because if they are caught, they’ll be sent home on the first available flight and in a country like Uzbekistan, they’ll be sent straight to a firing squad.

Why is Waziristan so important? Strategically speaking, it’s important for the same reason that Bajaur was important because it borders Afghanistan and offers cross border movement through an area with forbidding terrain. It provides TTP and their “guests” with access to move to/from Afghanistan. If and when they face heat in Pakistan, they move to Afghanistan.

It’s here, that the role of ISAF and ANA will come in to play, i.e. if they can manage to secure and seal their side of the Afghan border or not. Time for the Gov. of Pakistan and the Pakistani foreign office to ask them to ‘do more’.

Waziristan is not the end of it but think of it like climbing a mountain. In terms of counter insurgency, I think we would have climbed the major part of the mountain, if Waziristan is re-taken.

Last but not least, expect many attacks throughout Pakistan. I hope that I am wrong but that’s their modus operandi for exerting pressure, though a tactic of a bygone era, when public was not in favor of the war, itself.

That has now changed, especially in the aftermath of a successful operation (though military, while civilian rebuilding work is still lacking at many fronts) in Swat. Times have changed and so shall the results, this time around. InshAllah!

For our troops; good luck and god speed!

Pakistan army’s first operation in Swat

Federal government of Pakistan deployed troops of Pakistan army, in late 2007, in order to curb TNSM’s activities in the settled areas of Swat. The mission continued on for almost half a year and Pakistan army did manage to wrestle the control of valley of Swat back. Hundreds of militants were killed, caught or jailed. While the problem of militancy itself did not go away, it was significantly contained and people who formed the core of TNSM took refuge in Peochar Mountains which are remote and hard to reach, even for the military.

It was then that in order to fulfill promises made during the 2008 elections, the newly formed government of ANP in NWFP, pulled a plug on the operation and called the troops back. In addition to that, they also met TNSM’s demand of releasing all of their members from Pakistani jails, prior to the start of peace talks. It is due to these early peace deals that TTP/TNSM got the breathing space, they very much needed. Now, they were no longer cornered to a specific bit of terrain and did not have hundreds of fellows in jails anymore, since all of them got released. This resulted in giving another lease of life to the movement. Whatever ANP’s reasons were, this peace deal tossed Pakistan army’s efforts of the last six months out of the window like trash. All of the sacrifices made, including that of people of Swat themselves, and hard work done, went down the drain.

ANP has since been threatened by TNSM/TTP to give up their role in the government or else face retribution. Tens of its members have already been killed, and as of now, most of its ministers belonging to Swat valley are either residing in Peshawar or Islamabad. Here is to hoping that they learned their lesson.

What’s stopping the army from taking TNSM head-on like they took TTP in Bajaur?

In very simple words, the answer to that lies in the fact that we have far too many fronts open, at the same time. For example, we have a large deployment in Darra Adamkhel (a story in its own right) which is going to stay there for a long time to come. That place has been stabilized with great difficulty but thank God that we’ve managed to bring it under control. Bajaur is still an active battlefield, especially Mamond, Nawagai and Nawapass and even areas around Khar. Mohmand is burning and we are currently fighting there just like in Bajaur. An operation is active in Khyber agency and this area is likely to become more problematic over the course of next few months. And we happen to have a massive deployment around North/South Waziristan and these forces can definitely not be used for any other purpose. And, as if this was not enough, we have another fast rising hot spot in shape of Orakzai agency.

One of the questions that has always irked me, is that how militants in Swat are able to get their funding and weaponry, especially since Swat doesn’t share a border with Afghanistan? Let me put it this way; they have dozens of heavily loaded petrol/diesel guzzling 4×4 vehicles. They drive them a lot. No matter what you do, fuel is not cheap. Where do they get finances, for that? Whatever the source is, it’s the single biggest reason why they are still alive and kicking.

Now, take a good look at the areas on the map, marked in gray and their corresponding position with respect to the valley of Swat. And then ask yourselves, if it’s just a co-incidence that insurgency has suddenly gone up in all of the agencies, surrounding Swat. Answer that, and you’ll have the answer to the question, as to where do the artery which feeds this movement lie.

Unfortunately, since Pakistan Army is fighting on multiple fronts, it is going to take a considerable amount of time before everything goes back under control. And therefore, I don’t see Swat being stabilized anytime soon. My personal belief is that if we managed to pacify Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber and Orakzai in the near future, it’ll considerably daunt operational capabilities of TNSM in Swat, scaling it down to an extent where they become insignificant.

We, as a nation, are paying a very heavy price for wasting the last eight years arguing as to whether or not we’re facing an actual insurgency or if we even need to confront such organizations. It’s now, that we’re truly finding out, the consequences of our inability to reach upon a consensus on issues such as terrorism. The inability to reach upon a decision is worse than actually making a bad decision. For in the case of the former, you’ve to not only live through the consequences of your actions but also repeat this perpetual cycle, until you’re actually able to stick your head out of the sand and confront the reality.

Why have military operations proven inadequate in curbing militancy in Swat?

In my opinion, there are several reasons why Swat problem is probably still not ripe for solution:

• People of Pakistan do not fully recognize and admit Taliban as a problem.
• ANP government has failed to adopt a clear cut stance against Taliban.
• There is evidence that the number of locals involved with TNSM, for reasons discussed in the first part of this post, is large enough to cause serious problems with military efforts.
• Inability of the civilian government to take advantage of space provided by Army i.e. when army clears a place, it’s then the responsibility for Police, FC and government departments to fill and deny this space to militants. This includes taking measures in order to delegitimize TNSM’s existence.
• A rather clueless media effort, on part of the government and the military, in order to better present their side of the argument. In any given week, we see more statements being released to the Urdu press by the spokespersons of TTP and TNSM than all press releases that come out of ISPR, within the same time period.

What needs to be done?

• First and foremost, we need to take care of the very cause that gives legitimacy to the existence of militant organizations such as TNSM i.e. implementation of a proper judicial and governance system in Malakand division. Nizam e Adl (A justice system based on Shari’ah laws, but produced by the government of Pakistan), should be – in accordance with the wishes of the local populace – promptly implemented. Do mind, that I’m not trying to imply that the government of Pakistan should capitulate to unjustified demands of TNSM, instead it should listen to common people of the area.
• Secondly, they should keep a strict control over means of communication in and out of the valley of Swat. That includes keeping a tab on all cellular traffic, emails, roads, bridges etc.
• Jam their most potent propaganda tool i.e. the FM transmitter.
• Find their source of funding and block it. For no movement, no matter how committed its followers are, can continue without money and active assistance in terms of weapons.
• Deal with FATA more urgently. Because as things stand, much of the funding and weapons being used in Swat, are originating from FATA. They need to cut the artery that starts from North Waziristan and goes all the way to Swat, through several agencies.
• Get their act together, on the information warfare front. If a single Al-Jazeera documentary can bring about a sea of change in the points of view of youngsters (it’s has since been downloaded, burnt on CDs and spread in different education institutes of Pakistan). Why can’t ISPR, which is in custody of hate material, training manuals and documentary proof of activities of such organizations, not come up with a much better and more detailed documentary? ISPR should also provide access to such material to private media channels, which in turn can help sway public opinion. While I’ve not much to hope for, from the likes of a particular channel that likes to portray itself as the bastion of truth and fairness, which it is anything but. Other private media outlets are still good at what they do. I’d really like to see Talat Hussain, being given an opportunity to do what Rageh Omaar did for Al-Jazeera.
• Try not releasing militants, as a precursor to holding peace talks with militants. Considering the fact that we’ve been fooled not once but at numerous times, the shame is on us for continuously falling for the same trap, again and again and again.

I’m not claiming that the points raised in my post, are somehow the silver bullet, which we need in order to get out of this quagmire. But it’s my sincere belief, that it’s at least a step towards achieving a solution. I’d really like to know, as to what do you, the readers, have to say about this topic. And how would you like to bring about an end to the insurgency in Swat?

In order to read the first part of this post, click here.

For the last year and a half, the fast-escalating crisis in Swat has gripped the attention of the entire nation of Pakistan. We have all been reading, mostly in awe, about the on-going insurgency in Swat, bombings of girls’ schools, high-handedness of Pakistan Army and FC personnel, in dealing with such militant elements and about hints of Indian involvement in creating and sustaining this fiasco.

It is going to be a two-part post. In the first, I’ll make an attempt at describing the history of TNSM (Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi) and their political and religious motives behind this war. In my second post, I’ll divulge in to details of Pakistan Army’s current operation(s) against this militant outfit, reasons why such operations have proved to be inadequate and what can still be done in order to bring this situation under control.

My motive behind this post is to try and present a rather detailed picture of the ongoing situation in Swat, in order to enable you ‘the reader’ to make up your own mind about this war. Once you have done that, I’d like to read about it in the comments section, so please, do comment.

Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law – TNSM)

In order to understand how TNSM came in to being, we need to pay attention to the politics and economics of the Malakand region (which is TNSM’s primary base). In northwest Pakistan, three semi-autonomous states ‘Dir, Swat and Chitral’ were amalgamated to form the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1970. The laws of Pakistan were extended to the area, setting aside old legal systems such as Shari’ah law in Swat, under the Wali of Swat. Failures of government of Pakistan, in the aftermath of this change, in upholding law and order and provisioning of cheap justice in the area resulted in the alienation of local populace from the writ and laws of the State of Pakistan. Which is why, when a legal and armed battle ensued in 1975, in the aftermath of a dispute between the government and timber merchants about forest royalties in the area, it drew immense popularity from local populace. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, in order to control the situation implemented a new legal system of governance in the area, under the now-infamous FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulation). This order was then challenged first in Peshawar High Court and later in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, resulting in it being annulled. Thus creating a political vacuum, where an entire division was left without a proper justice and governance system. Do note that the precedent to get state’s attention through armed conflict and violence was set here. And the failure of government of Pakistan to address it in a prudent manner gave way to future repeats of such an occurrence.

Fast forward to the late 80s, when Sufi Mohammad, an activist of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and a cleric of Lal-Qila in Dir, had just returned to his native land from Afghanistan after his stint as one of the then celebrated ‘Mujahideens’. Being very convinced of his religious ideals, it was then that he decided to step in with the demand of enforcement of Shari’ah (Islamic Law) in the Malakand division, in order to fill in the gap left in the aftermath of Supreme Court’s decision to annul FCR in Malakand Division. And thus TNSM came in to being.

TNSM’s first major action was its clamant demand for the introduction of Shari’ah law in Malakand Division (which, before the implementation of the 2002 devolution plan, included the present day districts of Malakand, Swat and Chitral), expressed at a gathering in Dir on May 9, 1994. It was not a mere slogan, the demand, in fact, was an ultimatum. Within a couple of weeks, TNSM took control of the area, including government offices and Saidu Shareef airport, through sheer force and announced the imposition of Shari’ah law. The group’s call to arms drew large numbers of experienced Afghan fighters from nearby city of Peshawar and Bajaur Agency. The Pakistani government, as always, acted belatedly, taking almost 6 months to formulate a reply. It was in November 94′, that Pakistani paramilitary troops (FC) were then sent in, in order to take control of the situation. The resultant operation led to the deaths of more than 40 people, including a member of the provincial assembly and more than a dozen paramilitary troops, before some semblance of normality returned to the area. A peace deal was then brokered between government of Pakistan and Sufi Muhammad, in which government of Pakistan agreed to implement Shari’ah law in Malakand divison. But Sufi Muhammad declared, only after a month of the declared ceasefire, that the implementation of Shari’ah laws in Malakand was defective and that he’ll continue his struggle towards the goal of implementation of Shari’ah in Malakand.

At this point in time, while TNSM went off the radar and public eye, due to ongoing proxy wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan, it sustained its primary base of followers and continued building upon it. The political leadership in the country, for whatever reasons, failed to see and acknowledge that as a problem and thus didn’t feel the need to address it. The lack of proper implementation of the writ of government of Pakistan in Malakand division, its failure in providing means to deliver fast and cheap justice to people and a deteriorating local law and order situation made sure that TNSM never faced a dearth of followers.

The Resurgence

It was only after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent American campaign in Afghanistan that the government of Pakistan began to focus on TNSM. Sufi Mohammad by then was openly recruiting people to go to Afghanistan to fight U.S.-led forces. Soon he managed to cross into Afghanistan with approximately 7,000-8,000 volunteers to support the Taliban. When a majority of his soldiers had been either killed or captured, he returned home only to be arrested by government forces. He was ultimately convicted on April 24, 2002, along with his 30 companions, to seven years of imprisonment for inciting people to go to Afghanistan and for violating state restrictions. The organization was no longer a legitimate entity and was banned by President General Pervez Musharraf in January 2002. Some of its members drifted toward another extremist outfit; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of the Taliban of Pakistan – TTP) which was, at that point in time, operating from Orakzai agency.

While the arrest of Sufi Muhammad dealt a real blow to TNSM, his son-in-law Fazle Hayat took over TNSM under the nom de guerre of Maulana Fazlullah and helped restore the structure of the organization. He soon began making broadcasts from an illegal FM radio station installed in his mosque at Imam Dheri, in the Mutta Tehsil of Swat district. Delivering two sermons a day, he preached his version of militant Islam. At this point in time, ex President General Pervaiz Musharraf chose not to address the situation; even ignored the blatantly militant messages being broadcasted through Fazlullah sermons over the FM radio, in order to further fuel the conflict. This, in turn helped him portray his image to the world as that of a sole barrier against militants taking over Pakistan.

Then came the devastating earth quake of October 2005 in the north western areas of Pakistan. TNSM capitalised on this human catastrophe and re-energized itself. Volunteers from the TNSM led the vanguard of the relief work in the devastated areas of the NWFP. Not surprisingly, in the absence of timely official help, the locals came to admire these volunteers for their selfless devotion in helping the quake victims. TNSM at this point in time effectively started propagating that the natural calamity was visited upon the locals because they were becoming irreligious. The recommended remedy in their view was simple, living by a strict Shari’ah code i.e. defined by them. Striking when the iron was hot, they successfully campaigned for the destruction of television sets and video players. Due to the lack of education in the region, the message resonated with the locals and TNSM received a new lease of life.

Do mind, that a spineless effort on part of the MMA (Mutahidda Majlis e Amal – The combined platform of religio-political parties of Pakistan, which formed the government in NWFP from 2002 to 2007) to counter militant activities on part of TNSM was just as much responsible for furthering this crisis as ex President General Pervaiz Musharraf. MMA’s stance on militancy in Swat was in fact that of practical encouragement. First serious signs of trouble came when polio vaccination teams were attacked in Swat and MMA government surrendered its own writ by asking ‘permission’ from TNSM that kids be given polio drops. TNSM, given the situation, further upped the ante by announcing their private security force to take care of matters of ‘law and order’ in the valley of Swat; Shaheen Commando Force. Police were being attacked left, right and centre. There were large scale desertions. Frontier Constabulary (FC) also surrendered in very large numbers. MMA government was still extremely hesitant to call in help from federal government. In fact they never did so. Eventually, TNSM took physical control of police stations, government offices and even Saidu Sharif airport. It was then that Federal government decided to take matters in to its own hands and called a meeting of the Security Council. Chief minister Akram Durrani tried to avoid pressure from federal government to deploy troops but things weren’t really in his control. Suicide bombing had started and a large number of FC troops were killed in ambushes that involved massive amounts of explosives. Federal government then deployed troops of Pakistan army, in order to wrestle the control of Swat valley back from TNSM.

Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi and Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Taliban of Pakistan – TTP)

TNSM, right after the Red-Mosque debacle, sought to forge ties with Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Taliban of Pakistan – TTP) led by Baitullah Mehsud, in a bid to provide an umbrella to all insurgent movements operating in several tribal agencies and settled areas of the NWFP. Since then, Fazlullah and his followers are toeing Baitullah’s line, whether they are issuing a decree, signing a peace deal with the government or scrapping the same. Therefore, it appears by all accounts that the Fazlullah-led militants are working in the same mould as the TTP.

To read the second part, click here.

As the fallout from November’s bloody siege in Mumbai focuses the world’s attention on Pakistan’s ability to control enemy fighters within its own borders, Al Jazeera investigates Pakistan’s role in the so-called war on terror.

For watching episode 1, click here.

It’s a two episode series and a must watch for those who would like to educate themselves. By those, I refer to people who think that Pakistan is not doing enough in the war against terror and those who think that militants are godsend warriors and that PA shouldn’t be fighting them.

As the fallout from November’s bloody siege in Mumbai focuses the world’s attention on Pakistan’s ability to control enemy fighters within its own borders, Al Jazeera investigates Pakistan’s role in the so-called war on terror.

For watching episode 2, click here.

The following post will provide you different vantage points, in order to allow you to look at this particular event, with the perspective of all parties concerned. I’ll try my best to not to point fingers, instead make a feeble attempt at providing a suitable explanation of the above said event. Your comments will then tell me, as to how much of a success my attempt has been, so please, do comment, I’m eagerly looking forward to them.

The event

1. At 11:30 am PST [Pakistan Standard Time], 3 Indian Mirage 2000-H fighter jets crossed the line of control, intruding in airspace over Pakistani side of the disputed valley of Kashmir, up until approximately three to four miles before they were intercepted by 2 F16s and 2 Mirage III fighter jets of Pakistan air force.
2. The second intrusion was recorded at around 12:20 pm PST, when 2 Indian SU-30 MKIs crossed the international border near an eastern city of Pakistan; Lahore. During this instance, they were able to penetrate around 2 miles inside the Pakistani airspace before getting intercepted by 3 F-16s and 3 F7 fighter jets of Pakistan air force.

Given the murkiness surrounding the event, it’s still unknown (thus subject to a future update of this post), if the intruding aircrafts went back on their own upon registering PAF fighters on their radars, or were hailed by PAF fighters and got escorted out of Pakistani air space.

What does the political regime in India set to gain from such an operation?

From what I’ve read and seen, I believe the current regime in India tried to score two goals by launching such an operation.

1. The overwhelming domestic pressure inside India is forcing their government’s hand and pushing it toward taking unilateral military action against Pakistan-based militants. That said, it doesn’t need a rocket scientist to realize that any war or a mass scale conflict with Pakistan will worsen the security situation for India and in the broader region (read Allied forces residing in Afghanistan). Thus, in their attempt at striking a balance between the need to act and the need to exercise caution, New Delhi likely ordered the incursions as a means to sustain the pressure on Pakistan in order to make it continue its crackdown on militants, without really escalating the situation beyond the point of no return.
2. British Prime Minister was set to visit Pakistan and India, on Sunday morning i.e. December 14th, 2008. It was an excellent time to drive the point home (specially to the western intermediaries), that India is serious in achieving its targets inside Pakistan this time around. And what better way could there have been but by sounding alarms for an impending surgical aerial strike inside Pakistan.

What does Indian air force set to gain from such an operation?

This is certainly not the first time that Indian air force has sent its aircrafts over Pakistani territory in order to conduct ELINT (electronic intelligence) and RECCE (reconnaissance) operations. Throughout the 80s, 90s and much of early 2000s, IAF has been sending routine sorties of their MiG-25 FOXBAT fighter jet over Lahore, Islamabad and Azad Kashmir with relative impunity, considering the fact that Pakistan air force or the army have no weapon in their arsenal capable of countering an aircraft flying at MACH 3 at a height of a hundred thousand feet. But ever since its retirement in 2006, they have relied on their CARTOSAT/OCEANSAT/IRS series of satellites for visual surveillance of India’s neighborhood. While, satellites did give them a better surveillance capability, they do not allow them to record signatures for newer radar or SAM systems being incorporated by their neighbours (a much useful feature on the FOXBATs).

Therefore, if IAF are to in fact prepare to launch surgical strikes inside Pakistani territory, they will first need the following information:

1. The level of PAF’s preparedness and sortie generation speed.
2. Recording TPS-77 , YLC-2 and YLC-6 radar signatures (if they did in fact go live, during the intercept). Why? Because, these three are the newest radar systems acquired by PAF and thus their radar signatures are hitherto unknown to the Indians.
3. Check for any new fixed / mobile SAM (Surface to Air missiles) batteries which radars lit up, during their flight over Pakistani territory.

It should, therefore not come as a surprise that it were two of India’s finest birds (with Russian and Israeli EW [electronic warfare] equipment) that took to the sky for this particular mission.

Reaction of Government of Pakistan

Well, we’ve a joke of an information minister; Sherry Rehman, trying to drive across a point that doesn’t make sense to even a slightly thinking mind. There is always a span of 15 to 20 km on either side of a border that is considered a no fly zone (for military aircrafts). This span is utilized for reactionary purposes so as to allow reaction through aerial interception and engagement which requires 3 to 5 minutes in times of dire need. How can then two of the finest birds in Indian air force’s inventory make the same mistake (of entering Pakistani airspace while making a turn as per explained by the President of Pakistan; Asif Ali Zardari), at two different occasions, at two different points over Pakistani territory on the same day? Keep in mind that we are not talking about a single fighter jet in here, but complete sorties of 3 Mirage 2000-H and 2 SU-30 MKI aircrafts.

Does the explanation, put forward by the Government of Pakistan, make any sense to you now?

From where I see it and having a slight agreement with, Pakistani politicians do not want to get cornered and start a war (of any scale) with India. And are thus bending over backwards in order to appease them, even if it takes them to make illogical and irrational explanations describing some very visible signs of Indian belligerence. Another reason for doing this, is to keep the emotions of people of Pakistan in check. What I don’t know, is that how far their attempts will go.

Why? Because this is not the 80s anymore, information spreads like jungle-fire courtesy Pakistan’s private media outlets and more importantly, Pakistani military services do not seem to be in a mood to put up with such behaviour. What strengthens my belief is the fact that the news about PAF intercepting Indian fighters was leaked to the private media through PAF sources, after almost 12 hours of the said event. It didn’t come from the government of Pakistan.

What did PAF gain from the intercept?

One word; confidence. To be able to intercept enemy fighter jets within 2 – 5 miles of Pakistani airspace (that is equivalent of flight time of around 15 seconds for a jet fighter), suggests that they were not only ready for such a move on part of IAF but also on their toes, keeping a look out for it. While numerically and qualitatively, PAF jets are far inferior to what the Indians can put up in the air, the fact that they got air borne and reached the target area within such a short period of time, suggests that it was a job well done.

Conclusion

I believe there will be more instances of IAF aircrafts intruding in to Pakistani air space, over the course of next few days and weeks. What I am however, more interested in seeing is the response of PAF and that of the government of Pakistan. Will the government allow active intercept and neutralising of the threat? And in case of a surgical strike by IAF, how much of a free-hand will PAF get at giving a reply to the Indians?