I just got done watching Christine Fair (@christinefair)’s argument on AJ Stream in favor of the drone strikes, while inviting well deserved flak for some of her comments. 

While both Christine and other invitees had a good talk on use of drones, their efficacy, arguments against their usage; there were really no arguments made to form a counter-narrative to the use of drones. Or that drones in effect are tools of war, aerial bombardment of any sort, in populated areas will result in civilian causalities. If you are serious about offering drone victims a respite, then you have to come up with an alternate narrative that actually deals with the situation on the ground.

The only alternate on offer was to conduct talks with the militants, like the ones being done in Afghanistan by the US. And the best part about this argument is that while making this point, there is not a single commentator, who would like to get into the details of these talks. The US pull-out plan includes maintaining spec-op troops in the country, with the CIA continuing to maintain its full strength presence (meaning more drones, and not less). Now, how can the same formula apply in Pakistan’s case? What are ‘our’ options on the table, when we suggest that the alternate to drones are talks with militants?

The only party in Pakistan which is currently offering a workable long-term alternative to that plan seems to be ANP, which wants to assimilate FATA into KPK. While there exist points both for and against the assimilation, as far as effective policing of FATA is concerned, this seems to be the only workable alternative. Otherwise, what you are left with, is an area which has little or no writ of the state and acts independent of the state’s policy.

Military strikes of any sort which result in civilian causalities deserve condemnation without question, there is no moral defense for it. At the same time, these military strikes and tools of war, will not cease to exist, only because we want them to, unless the reasons why they are being employed are dealt with. Isn’t this the time when opinion makers in Pakistan actually start coming up with workable alternatives to use of drones?

Almost every major newspaper in Pakistan has gone nuts starting yesterday morning when Guardian established it on authority that Raymond is in fact working on contract with the CIA and was originally employed by XE (previously Blackwater). As of today Washington Post has further divulged that he was a part of a JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) covert unit, authorized to locate Al Qaeda and Lashker e Taiba members in Pakistan.

This bit of information gives further credence to the three reports by Jeremy Scahill for The Nation last year, which were at that time dis-credited by majority of the regional security analysis crowd as extreme far-left hogwash.

The Secret US War in Pakistan
The Expanding US War in Pakistan
Blackwater in Pakistan

Now, I have in mind a few questions, which I believe if answered, can correctly reflect upon the current status of cooperation between intelligence agencies of the United States and that of Pakistan.

It is generally considered true that ISI already knew about Raymond Davis’s employer being the CIA. Now, merging that information with the fact that a similar CIA unit helped ISI grab Mullah Bradar in Karachi last year, it can be reasonable well established that ISI was in absolute knowledge of the activities of this particular cell.

1. So how were the two other men, responsible for a hit and run, while trying to reach Davis able to escape Pakistan? I know it as well as any serious reader in here, that when it comes to intel ops, ECL is not the only list that can stop people from traveling out of Pakistan.
2. If the said unit was in fact snooping around for LeT members, and the ISI was already in cohorts, what does that say about our aspirations regarding local militant groups? Has ISI finally started the crackdown, even if in such a meagre way?
3. And the most serious question of them all, if for some reason the ISI did not know about what this unit was up to, what does that say about our counter-intelligence capabilities?

There’s a fourth question as well, and this is meant for the media coverage of this issue.

4. Associated Press, Washington Post and The New York Times all withheld information regarding Raymond Davis’s true employer in order to protect him from further scrutiny in Pakistan and for the sake of ‘National Security’ – how many Pakistani media channels or news papers would have done the same, if put in a similar situation?

In my personal opinion, it is about time that the military establishment and government of Pakistan came out clean when it comes to ties between US intelligence agencies and their Pakistani counter-parts. By doing that, they will not only be able to counter propaganda and spread of mis-information. But also let the world know, that Pakistan is in fact playing a serious role in this war.

While yes, there might be consequences for such a decision, but with the speed with which such incidents are coming to light these days, courtesy news media and the internet – they would be far better off by not being on the back-foot at every single such instance. It is time to get serious about this side of information warfare as well.

Pakistan army’s first operation in Swat

Federal government of Pakistan deployed troops of Pakistan army, in late 2007, in order to curb TNSM’s activities in the settled areas of Swat. The mission continued on for almost half a year and Pakistan army did manage to wrestle the control of valley of Swat back. Hundreds of militants were killed, caught or jailed. While the problem of militancy itself did not go away, it was significantly contained and people who formed the core of TNSM took refuge in Peochar Mountains which are remote and hard to reach, even for the military.

It was then that in order to fulfill promises made during the 2008 elections, the newly formed government of ANP in NWFP, pulled a plug on the operation and called the troops back. In addition to that, they also met TNSM’s demand of releasing all of their members from Pakistani jails, prior to the start of peace talks. It is due to these early peace deals that TTP/TNSM got the breathing space, they very much needed. Now, they were no longer cornered to a specific bit of terrain and did not have hundreds of fellows in jails anymore, since all of them got released. This resulted in giving another lease of life to the movement. Whatever ANP’s reasons were, this peace deal tossed Pakistan army’s efforts of the last six months out of the window like trash. All of the sacrifices made, including that of people of Swat themselves, and hard work done, went down the drain.

ANP has since been threatened by TNSM/TTP to give up their role in the government or else face retribution. Tens of its members have already been killed, and as of now, most of its ministers belonging to Swat valley are either residing in Peshawar or Islamabad. Here is to hoping that they learned their lesson.

What’s stopping the army from taking TNSM head-on like they took TTP in Bajaur?

In very simple words, the answer to that lies in the fact that we have far too many fronts open, at the same time. For example, we have a large deployment in Darra Adamkhel (a story in its own right) which is going to stay there for a long time to come. That place has been stabilized with great difficulty but thank God that we’ve managed to bring it under control. Bajaur is still an active battlefield, especially Mamond, Nawagai and Nawapass and even areas around Khar. Mohmand is burning and we are currently fighting there just like in Bajaur. An operation is active in Khyber agency and this area is likely to become more problematic over the course of next few months. And we happen to have a massive deployment around North/South Waziristan and these forces can definitely not be used for any other purpose. And, as if this was not enough, we have another fast rising hot spot in shape of Orakzai agency.

One of the questions that has always irked me, is that how militants in Swat are able to get their funding and weaponry, especially since Swat doesn’t share a border with Afghanistan? Let me put it this way; they have dozens of heavily loaded petrol/diesel guzzling 4×4 vehicles. They drive them a lot. No matter what you do, fuel is not cheap. Where do they get finances, for that? Whatever the source is, it’s the single biggest reason why they are still alive and kicking.

Now, take a good look at the areas on the map, marked in gray and their corresponding position with respect to the valley of Swat. And then ask yourselves, if it’s just a co-incidence that insurgency has suddenly gone up in all of the agencies, surrounding Swat. Answer that, and you’ll have the answer to the question, as to where do the artery which feeds this movement lie.

Unfortunately, since Pakistan Army is fighting on multiple fronts, it is going to take a considerable amount of time before everything goes back under control. And therefore, I don’t see Swat being stabilized anytime soon. My personal belief is that if we managed to pacify Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber and Orakzai in the near future, it’ll considerably daunt operational capabilities of TNSM in Swat, scaling it down to an extent where they become insignificant.

We, as a nation, are paying a very heavy price for wasting the last eight years arguing as to whether or not we’re facing an actual insurgency or if we even need to confront such organizations. It’s now, that we’re truly finding out, the consequences of our inability to reach upon a consensus on issues such as terrorism. The inability to reach upon a decision is worse than actually making a bad decision. For in the case of the former, you’ve to not only live through the consequences of your actions but also repeat this perpetual cycle, until you’re actually able to stick your head out of the sand and confront the reality.

Why have military operations proven inadequate in curbing militancy in Swat?

In my opinion, there are several reasons why Swat problem is probably still not ripe for solution:

• People of Pakistan do not fully recognize and admit Taliban as a problem.
• ANP government has failed to adopt a clear cut stance against Taliban.
• There is evidence that the number of locals involved with TNSM, for reasons discussed in the first part of this post, is large enough to cause serious problems with military efforts.
• Inability of the civilian government to take advantage of space provided by Army i.e. when army clears a place, it’s then the responsibility for Police, FC and government departments to fill and deny this space to militants. This includes taking measures in order to delegitimize TNSM’s existence.
• A rather clueless media effort, on part of the government and the military, in order to better present their side of the argument. In any given week, we see more statements being released to the Urdu press by the spokespersons of TTP and TNSM than all press releases that come out of ISPR, within the same time period.

What needs to be done?

• First and foremost, we need to take care of the very cause that gives legitimacy to the existence of militant organizations such as TNSM i.e. implementation of a proper judicial and governance system in Malakand division. Nizam e Adl (A justice system based on Shari’ah laws, but produced by the government of Pakistan), should be – in accordance with the wishes of the local populace – promptly implemented. Do mind, that I’m not trying to imply that the government of Pakistan should capitulate to unjustified demands of TNSM, instead it should listen to common people of the area.
• Secondly, they should keep a strict control over means of communication in and out of the valley of Swat. That includes keeping a tab on all cellular traffic, emails, roads, bridges etc.
• Jam their most potent propaganda tool i.e. the FM transmitter.
• Find their source of funding and block it. For no movement, no matter how committed its followers are, can continue without money and active assistance in terms of weapons.
• Deal with FATA more urgently. Because as things stand, much of the funding and weapons being used in Swat, are originating from FATA. They need to cut the artery that starts from North Waziristan and goes all the way to Swat, through several agencies.
• Get their act together, on the information warfare front. If a single Al-Jazeera documentary can bring about a sea of change in the points of view of youngsters (it’s has since been downloaded, burnt on CDs and spread in different education institutes of Pakistan). Why can’t ISPR, which is in custody of hate material, training manuals and documentary proof of activities of such organizations, not come up with a much better and more detailed documentary? ISPR should also provide access to such material to private media channels, which in turn can help sway public opinion. While I’ve not much to hope for, from the likes of a particular channel that likes to portray itself as the bastion of truth and fairness, which it is anything but. Other private media outlets are still good at what they do. I’d really like to see Talat Hussain, being given an opportunity to do what Rageh Omaar did for Al-Jazeera.
• Try not releasing militants, as a precursor to holding peace talks with militants. Considering the fact that we’ve been fooled not once but at numerous times, the shame is on us for continuously falling for the same trap, again and again and again.

I’m not claiming that the points raised in my post, are somehow the silver bullet, which we need in order to get out of this quagmire. But it’s my sincere belief, that it’s at least a step towards achieving a solution. I’d really like to know, as to what do you, the readers, have to say about this topic. And how would you like to bring about an end to the insurgency in Swat?

In order to read the first part of this post, click here.

For the last year and a half, the fast-escalating crisis in Swat has gripped the attention of the entire nation of Pakistan. We have all been reading, mostly in awe, about the on-going insurgency in Swat, bombings of girls’ schools, high-handedness of Pakistan Army and FC personnel, in dealing with such militant elements and about hints of Indian involvement in creating and sustaining this fiasco.

It is going to be a two-part post. In the first, I’ll make an attempt at describing the history of TNSM (Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi) and their political and religious motives behind this war. In my second post, I’ll divulge in to details of Pakistan Army’s current operation(s) against this militant outfit, reasons why such operations have proved to be inadequate and what can still be done in order to bring this situation under control.

My motive behind this post is to try and present a rather detailed picture of the ongoing situation in Swat, in order to enable you ‘the reader’ to make up your own mind about this war. Once you have done that, I’d like to read about it in the comments section, so please, do comment.

Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law – TNSM)

In order to understand how TNSM came in to being, we need to pay attention to the politics and economics of the Malakand region (which is TNSM’s primary base). In northwest Pakistan, three semi-autonomous states ‘Dir, Swat and Chitral’ were amalgamated to form the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1970. The laws of Pakistan were extended to the area, setting aside old legal systems such as Shari’ah law in Swat, under the Wali of Swat. Failures of government of Pakistan, in the aftermath of this change, in upholding law and order and provisioning of cheap justice in the area resulted in the alienation of local populace from the writ and laws of the State of Pakistan. Which is why, when a legal and armed battle ensued in 1975, in the aftermath of a dispute between the government and timber merchants about forest royalties in the area, it drew immense popularity from local populace. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, in order to control the situation implemented a new legal system of governance in the area, under the now-infamous FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulation). This order was then challenged first in Peshawar High Court and later in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, resulting in it being annulled. Thus creating a political vacuum, where an entire division was left without a proper justice and governance system. Do note that the precedent to get state’s attention through armed conflict and violence was set here. And the failure of government of Pakistan to address it in a prudent manner gave way to future repeats of such an occurrence.

Fast forward to the late 80s, when Sufi Mohammad, an activist of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and a cleric of Lal-Qila in Dir, had just returned to his native land from Afghanistan after his stint as one of the then celebrated ‘Mujahideens’. Being very convinced of his religious ideals, it was then that he decided to step in with the demand of enforcement of Shari’ah (Islamic Law) in the Malakand division, in order to fill in the gap left in the aftermath of Supreme Court’s decision to annul FCR in Malakand Division. And thus TNSM came in to being.

TNSM’s first major action was its clamant demand for the introduction of Shari’ah law in Malakand Division (which, before the implementation of the 2002 devolution plan, included the present day districts of Malakand, Swat and Chitral), expressed at a gathering in Dir on May 9, 1994. It was not a mere slogan, the demand, in fact, was an ultimatum. Within a couple of weeks, TNSM took control of the area, including government offices and Saidu Shareef airport, through sheer force and announced the imposition of Shari’ah law. The group’s call to arms drew large numbers of experienced Afghan fighters from nearby city of Peshawar and Bajaur Agency. The Pakistani government, as always, acted belatedly, taking almost 6 months to formulate a reply. It was in November 94′, that Pakistani paramilitary troops (FC) were then sent in, in order to take control of the situation. The resultant operation led to the deaths of more than 40 people, including a member of the provincial assembly and more than a dozen paramilitary troops, before some semblance of normality returned to the area. A peace deal was then brokered between government of Pakistan and Sufi Muhammad, in which government of Pakistan agreed to implement Shari’ah law in Malakand divison. But Sufi Muhammad declared, only after a month of the declared ceasefire, that the implementation of Shari’ah laws in Malakand was defective and that he’ll continue his struggle towards the goal of implementation of Shari’ah in Malakand.

At this point in time, while TNSM went off the radar and public eye, due to ongoing proxy wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan, it sustained its primary base of followers and continued building upon it. The political leadership in the country, for whatever reasons, failed to see and acknowledge that as a problem and thus didn’t feel the need to address it. The lack of proper implementation of the writ of government of Pakistan in Malakand division, its failure in providing means to deliver fast and cheap justice to people and a deteriorating local law and order situation made sure that TNSM never faced a dearth of followers.

The Resurgence

It was only after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent American campaign in Afghanistan that the government of Pakistan began to focus on TNSM. Sufi Mohammad by then was openly recruiting people to go to Afghanistan to fight U.S.-led forces. Soon he managed to cross into Afghanistan with approximately 7,000-8,000 volunteers to support the Taliban. When a majority of his soldiers had been either killed or captured, he returned home only to be arrested by government forces. He was ultimately convicted on April 24, 2002, along with his 30 companions, to seven years of imprisonment for inciting people to go to Afghanistan and for violating state restrictions. The organization was no longer a legitimate entity and was banned by President General Pervez Musharraf in January 2002. Some of its members drifted toward another extremist outfit; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of the Taliban of Pakistan – TTP) which was, at that point in time, operating from Orakzai agency.

While the arrest of Sufi Muhammad dealt a real blow to TNSM, his son-in-law Fazle Hayat took over TNSM under the nom de guerre of Maulana Fazlullah and helped restore the structure of the organization. He soon began making broadcasts from an illegal FM radio station installed in his mosque at Imam Dheri, in the Mutta Tehsil of Swat district. Delivering two sermons a day, he preached his version of militant Islam. At this point in time, ex President General Pervaiz Musharraf chose not to address the situation; even ignored the blatantly militant messages being broadcasted through Fazlullah sermons over the FM radio, in order to further fuel the conflict. This, in turn helped him portray his image to the world as that of a sole barrier against militants taking over Pakistan.

Then came the devastating earth quake of October 2005 in the north western areas of Pakistan. TNSM capitalised on this human catastrophe and re-energized itself. Volunteers from the TNSM led the vanguard of the relief work in the devastated areas of the NWFP. Not surprisingly, in the absence of timely official help, the locals came to admire these volunteers for their selfless devotion in helping the quake victims. TNSM at this point in time effectively started propagating that the natural calamity was visited upon the locals because they were becoming irreligious. The recommended remedy in their view was simple, living by a strict Shari’ah code i.e. defined by them. Striking when the iron was hot, they successfully campaigned for the destruction of television sets and video players. Due to the lack of education in the region, the message resonated with the locals and TNSM received a new lease of life.

Do mind, that a spineless effort on part of the MMA (Mutahidda Majlis e Amal – The combined platform of religio-political parties of Pakistan, which formed the government in NWFP from 2002 to 2007) to counter militant activities on part of TNSM was just as much responsible for furthering this crisis as ex President General Pervaiz Musharraf. MMA’s stance on militancy in Swat was in fact that of practical encouragement. First serious signs of trouble came when polio vaccination teams were attacked in Swat and MMA government surrendered its own writ by asking ‘permission’ from TNSM that kids be given polio drops. TNSM, given the situation, further upped the ante by announcing their private security force to take care of matters of ‘law and order’ in the valley of Swat; Shaheen Commando Force. Police were being attacked left, right and centre. There were large scale desertions. Frontier Constabulary (FC) also surrendered in very large numbers. MMA government was still extremely hesitant to call in help from federal government. In fact they never did so. Eventually, TNSM took physical control of police stations, government offices and even Saidu Sharif airport. It was then that Federal government decided to take matters in to its own hands and called a meeting of the Security Council. Chief minister Akram Durrani tried to avoid pressure from federal government to deploy troops but things weren’t really in his control. Suicide bombing had started and a large number of FC troops were killed in ambushes that involved massive amounts of explosives. Federal government then deployed troops of Pakistan army, in order to wrestle the control of Swat valley back from TNSM.

Tehreek e Nifaz e Shareeat e Muhammadi and Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Taliban of Pakistan – TTP)

TNSM, right after the Red-Mosque debacle, sought to forge ties with Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Taliban of Pakistan – TTP) led by Baitullah Mehsud, in a bid to provide an umbrella to all insurgent movements operating in several tribal agencies and settled areas of the NWFP. Since then, Fazlullah and his followers are toeing Baitullah’s line, whether they are issuing a decree, signing a peace deal with the government or scrapping the same. Therefore, it appears by all accounts that the Fazlullah-led militants are working in the same mould as the TTP.

To read the second part, click here.

As the fallout from November’s bloody siege in Mumbai focuses the world’s attention on Pakistan’s ability to control enemy fighters within its own borders, Al Jazeera investigates Pakistan’s role in the so-called war on terror.

For watching episode 1, click here.

It’s a two episode series and a must watch for those who would like to educate themselves. By those, I refer to people who think that Pakistan is not doing enough in the war against terror and those who think that militants are godsend warriors and that PA shouldn’t be fighting them.

As the fallout from November’s bloody siege in Mumbai focuses the world’s attention on Pakistan’s ability to control enemy fighters within its own borders, Al Jazeera investigates Pakistan’s role in the so-called war on terror.

For watching episode 2, click here.

“A Muslim can never conduct a suicide attack against his fellow Muslims; it has to be a Zionist cum American cum Indian conspiracy”.

How many times have you heard your friends say that, in a gathering whenever you get to discuss the terrible phenomenon i.e. Terrorism? Yet, they fail to cite a single such example of an Indian, American or Israeli who actually strapped bombs on his body, and blew himself on the streets of our beloved homeland.

So what really is the problem here?

Is it that Pakistanis, in general, fail to recognize the problem that terrorism poses? Is it that their religious convictions affect their judgment, when it comes to identifying such elements? Do they deliberately over look the danger, in spite of the suffering that it has brought them over the course of last few years? Is it because the media, at times, portrays such elements as the ‘grieved’ party? Or is it that they consider these elements the lesser evil of the two; US of A / Government of Pakistan being the bigger devils, of course.

Whatever the case be, the facts state that our sense of apathy towards terrorism and its victims is costing us dearly in terms of both human life and economy. And yet we fail to recognize the threat. Politicians would have you believe that terrorism will simply fade away once the Americans get out of Afghanistan. Religious leaders have either been threatened to maintain silence or they’re just too busy building a political career out of Islam, to actually care. While the Pakistani media, oh boy, the media wants you to remain contended after knowing that it’s Pakistan army and spineless politicians who are actually responsible for the existence of such elements. Not that I’m contending any of those assertions. But what really gets me ticked off is the fact that there is all this talk about sharing the burden of responsibility and yet no one seems concerned about tackling the issue itself. While our cities (yes Mengora, Sedo Sharif, Kalam and Peshawar are in fact our cities and towns) are being overrun by thugs and murderers operating under the banner of Taliban, those responsible for running this country are busy playing a game of passing the parcel, in this case, it’s the responsibility that gets passed from person A to person B and then back. And we’re stuck with perpetually repeating this cycle of practicing idiocy.

Such behavior is not only taking our eyes of the issue of terrorism itself but also giving the people of Pakistan a much skewed view of the reality. A view that overlooks the fact that it’s Muslims, yes they not only share our faith but claim that they’re doing it for the faith, are strapping bombs on their bodies and blowing themselves up amongst us. Instead of confronting that reality, acknowledging that it is a problem and then try finding a cure, we have instead chosen to stick our heads in the sand and make ourselves believe that it’s all part of a ‘global conspiracy’ against Muslims.

Now, I understand that Pakistanis are not really a monolithic entity and they, just like any other community, have different points of view which they owe to certain belief sets that have over time been instilled in them and the set of information available to them, at a particular point in time. This is where, I believe, comes the responsibility of the government and those who form public opinion to make the nation realize, that we are in fact facing a problem and that we cannot just shy away from our responsibility, not when it is affecting our lives and those of our dear ones, so severely. And to tell them, that if we did not choose to wake up to the reality, then we’ll be another one of those nations fighting a never-ending war against an insurgency that gets so bloody, that in the end no one knows what it is all about.

At least that is what I, as a Pakistani, wish they did.

In my previous post, my first question to Imran Khan made an assertion about sectarian groups forming an alliance with AQ and Taliban. After going through the following investigative report by the Guardian newspaper, it seems like I wasn’t that far off.

You can read the report here.